Aging and Pension Reform in a Two-Region World: The Role of Human Capital

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Questions & General Setup

- Effects of population aging on
 - Factor prices
 - Welfare
- How do answers change
 - 1. With endogenous human capital
 - 2. Under different social security regimes / pension reforms
 - 3. More interesting: interaction of 1.) and 2.)

- Two-region open economy OLG model with endogenous
 - Consumption/saving decision
 - Labor supply
 - Human capital accumulation

Household Setup

- Agents start making decisions at age 16, retire at age 65 (benchmark) and live at most until age 90
- They choose each period
 - Consumption/saving
 - Labor supply
 - Time investment into human capital
- ... and like consumption and leisure
- Receive labor income or pensions
 - Linear contribution rate τ to social security
 - $\bullet\,$ Pensions are a fraction ρ of current net wages

Formal Representation

Macroeconomic Setup & Government

- Aggregate production with physical capital and effective labor
- Effective labor $L_t = \sum_{j=0}^{jr-1} \ell_{t,j} N_{t,j} h_{t,j}$
- Factors earn marginal products
- Regional labor markets, international capital markets, exogenous technical progress
- Balanced budget PAYGO social security with two scenarios
 - 1. Benchmark Retirement: replacement rate ρ or contribution rate τ fixed
 - 2. Pension Reform: increase retirement age given τ/ρ regime

Pension Reform & Calibration

- Increasing the Retirement Age
 - Simple rule: for additional 1.5 years of life expectancy at age 65 retirement increases by one year
 - Retirement age of 71 years

▶ U.S. Life Expectancy at Age 65

Calibration

- Demographics: United Nations
 - "Old": basically OECD
 - "Young": rest of the world
- Targets: K/Y, avg. labor supply, I/Y, region-specific wage profiles, and region-specific growth of GDP/Capita

Retirement Age & Wage Profiles

▶ WAPR

Thought Experiment & Results

- Thought experiment
 - Exogenous demographics induces economic transition
 - Two human capital specifications
 - Exogenous human capital
 - Endogenous human capital
 - $\Rightarrow\,$ during calibration identical, then diverging
- Results
 - Macroeconomic variables
 - Rate of return
 - Detrended GDP per capita
 - Welfare of households alive in 2010
 - Effects of pension reform
 - Focus on
 - Endogenous vs. exogenous human capital
 - Results for "old" countries, open economy

Benchmark Retirement Age: Rate of Return

Figure: Rate of Return



Open vs. Closed

Benchmark Retirement Age: Detrended GDP per Capita

Figure: Detrended GDP per Capita



Open vs. Closed

Pension Reform: Detrended GDP per Capita (1)

Figure: Detrended GDP per Capita



Rate of Return

Pension Reform: Decomposition of Effects

Effects of increasing retirement age on GDP/Capita

- Exogenous human capital
 - 1. "Mechanical" effect \Rightarrow more working people
 - 2. Higher labor supply if $\tau \downarrow$

Endogenous human capital

- 1. "Mechanical" effect \Rightarrow more working people
- 2. Higher investment into human capital
- 3. Higher labor supply (to make use of 2.)
- 4. Higher labor supply and human capital if $\tau \downarrow \Rightarrow$ effects are not additive

Pension Reform: Detrended GDP per Capita (2)

Figure: Detrended GDP per Capita



- Define a base year (here 2010)
- Compute (remaining) lifetime utility V_{GE} given GE prices
- "Freeze" prices/transfers from base year and recompute V_{2010}
- Welfare difference expressed as Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV)
- Positive numbers are welfare gains from GE effects

Welfare Evaluation - Graph

Welfare Effects of Reform: Agents alive in 2010





Open vs. Closed

Welfare Effects of Reform: Agents alive in 2010

Table: Maximum Welfare Losses - Agents alive 2010

	Open Economy			
Pension System	Constant ρ		Constant $ au$	
	Endog.	Exog.	Endog.	Exog.
Benchmark	-3.0%	-3.6%	-4.4%	-6.5%
Pension Reform	-1.9%	-3.0%	-3.6%	-6.0%

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Table: Maximum Welfare Losses - Agents alive 2010

	Open Economy			
Pension System	Constant ρ		Constant τ	
	Endog.	Exog.	Endog.	Exog.
Benchmark	-3.0%	-3.6%	-4.4%	-6.5%
Pension Reform	-1.9%	-3.0%	-3.6%	-6.0%
Difference	36.7%	16.7%	18.2%	7.7%

Conclusions & Policy Implications

- Investment into human capital substantially dampens
 - effects of aging on factor prices
 - welfare losses
- PI: Important to keep this adjustment channel flexible
 - A generous pension system is more redistributive but lowers welfare of future generations
 - Higher retirement age can substantially increase welfare, especially when distortions are already high
- PI: Small distortions are magnified: human capital is "multiplier" \Rightarrow effects are not additive
- PI: Inequality best decreased by increasing retirement age
 - Warning: we assumed a frictionless world ⇒ results are only upper/lower bounds of "true" effects

Table: Model Parameters

			"Young"	"Old"
Preferences	σ	Inverse of Inter-Temporal Elasticity of Subst.	2.00	
	β	Pure Time Discount Factor	0.985	
	ϕ	Weight of Consumption	0.370	
Human Capital	ξ	Scaling Factor	0.176	0.166
	ψ	Curvature Parameter	0.576	0.586
	δ^h	Depreciation Rate of Human Capital	1.4%	0.9%
	h_0	Initial Human Capital Endowment	1.00	1.00
Production	α	Share of Physical Capital in Production	0.33	
	δ	Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital	3.5%	
	gA	Exogenous Growth Rate		
		Calibration Period	1.5%	1.9%
		Final Steady State	1.9%	1.9%

Notes: "Young" and "Old" refer to the region. Only one value in a column indicates that the parameter is identical for both regions.

U.S. Life Expectancy

Figure: U.S. Life Expectancy at Age 65



Sources: Human Mortality Database (2011).

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Figure: Constant vs. Variable Prices





Benchmark Retirement Age: Net Foreign Assets

Figure: Net Foreign Assets



Benchmark Retirement Age: Net Foreign Assets

Figure: Net Foreign Assets



Benchmark Retirement: Comparison GDP/GNP per Capita

Figure: Comparison GDP/GNP per Capita



- Compute equilibrium transition path for closed economies
- We then "surprise" agents by opening up the economy in 1975
- Compute the transition to the open economy steady-state
- Agents alive in 1975 re-optimize for their remaining lifetime, newborns use prices and transfers from open economy

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Benchmark Retirement Age: Rate of Return

Figure: Rate of Return





Household Setup - Formal Representation

Formally, agents maximize

$$\max \sum_{j=0}^{J} \beta^{j} \pi_{j} \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \{ c_{j}^{\phi} (\underbrace{1-\ell_{j}-e_{j}}_{leisure})^{1-\phi} \}^{1-\sigma}$$

subject to

$$\begin{array}{lll} a_{j+1} & = & \begin{cases} (a_j + tr_t)(1 + r_t) + w_{t,j}^n - c_j & \text{if } j < jr \\ (a_j + tr_t)(1 + r_t) + p_t - c_j & \text{if } j \geq jr \end{cases} \\ w_{t,j}^n & = & \ell_j h_j w_t (1 - \tau_t) \end{array}$$

human capital formation using Ben-Porath (1967) technology

$$h_{j+1} = h_j(1-\delta^h) + \xi(h_j e_j)^{\psi}$$

Benchmark Retirement Age: Detrended GDP per Capita

Figure: Detrended GDP per Capita



Welfare Effects Benchm. Retirement: Agents alive in 2010

Figure: Welfare: Agents alive in 2010



Retirement Age & Wage Profiles



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Figure: Rate of Return



Figure: Working Age Population Ratio



Sources: United Nations (2007) and own computations. "Old" includes USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and the EU15 "Young" all other countries

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