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13<sup>th</sup> Annual Joint Conference of the Retirement Research Consortium

August 4, 2011

Washington, DC



- **Overlapping Generations Model** 
  - Aging society → K:L ratio 1



- Rates of Return on Capital
- Wages †
- Add adjustments (1) human capital accumulation and (2) open economy.
- Two region model -- capital flows occur between two regions
  - "Old": US (aging demographic least worst of group), Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and EU15.
  - "Young": all other countries
  - Overall demographic trends very similar btw "regions"; although strong level differences.

- Welfare effects (also Macro Aggregates) under different State pension policy scenarios (pay-as-you-go system).
  - Benchmark Scenarios
    - Constant contribution rate → adjust (down) SS payments
    - Constant replacement rate → adjust (up) contribution rate
  - Benchmark with Pension Reform
    - Increase Statutory Retirement Age (from 65)
      - Working Longer
    - 1 year increase for every 1.5 increase in life expectancy
- Different Welfare Implications for different age cohorts and future generations


- Focus on Two Key Results
  - (1) Human capital accumulation can mitigate some of the negative welfare consequences of an aging society.
  - (2) Increasing the retirement age has strong positive welfare effects.
    - Regardless of Benchmark Scenario
    - Incentives to invest in HC over the life-cycle because working longer.

- The Paper's Implications for US Social Security reform
  - Don't increase the disincentives to invest in human capital →
     Don't increase payroll taxes
  - 2. Increase the Full Retirement Age
- (1) Payroll Taxes?
  - Need to consider size of affected population and magnitude of increase – <u>disincentives may not be strong</u>.
  - Option 1: Increase taxable maximum earnings (\$106,800)
    - Only about 6% of workers have earnings > tax max and only a subset would experience an increase in marginal payroll tax rate.
    - Not a pure tax benefit payouts would also increase
    - Liebman and Saez 2006
  - Option 2: increase payroll tax rate
    - A small increase in payroll tax rate goes a long way: a 4 percent increase (6.2% to 6.45%) closes 25 percent of 75-year shortfall.

- The Paper's Implications for US Social Security reform
  - Don't increase the disincentives to invest in human capital →
     Don't increase payroll taxes
  - 2. Increase the Full Retirement Age
- (2) Increasing Full Retirement Age?
  - Working Longer is key!
    - Requires desire to work longer <u>and</u> opportunities
      - Policies must address both sides (supply and demand)
    - Could get more responsiveness to FRA change if combined with other supply and demand changes.
      - Increase in FRA explains some of the increase in LFP among men 55-69 (Blau and Goodstein 2010).
    - Explore other changes to SS rules to increase work incentives
      - Soc. Sec. more or less neutral w/ respect to work incentives.

#### Pension incentives to work/retire

Change in pension wealth from working an additional year, between ages 60 and 65, per cent of annual earnings



Source: Pensions at a Glance 2011, OECD (from Edward Whitehouse presentation)

- Well developed paper with clear explanations of OLG model and modifications (especially for a novice like me).
- Interesting extension of model to pension policy.
- Explore opportunities for intergenerational redistribution
  - Like to see development of "alternative compensation mechanisms..."